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En este artículo examino el problema de si la 
concepción socrática de la eudaimonia entraña el 
egoísmo. Esto es, si, según Sócrates, un hombre 
que actúa teniendo como criterio final su felicidad es un egoísta. 
Este punto de vista parece entrar en contradicción con lo que 
pensamos comúnmente acerca de lo que debe decir una teoría 
moral. Clasifico los intentos que se han hecho por resolver el pro-
blema en dos grupos: los formalistas y los sustantivistas, con base 
en sus objetivos generales. Argumento que la segunda clase de 
enfoque es más efectiva, puesto que trata de interpretar la teoría 
de Sócrates como un todo y la hace más coherente. Asume que 
Sócrates ofrece una teoría de la motivación humana para actuar 
en la que el agente busca su felicidad, pero otorgando también 
una función central a la amistad, el amor y la justicia. 
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Socrates on Egoism. Does he say we should be virtuous 
and egoists?
In this paper I address the issue whether Socratic 
eudaimonia entails egoism. It is, whether accor-
ding to Socrates’ view a man who acts having 
his happiness as final criteria for his acts is an egoist. This view 
seems to be in contradiction with what we commonly think a 
moral theory must say. I gather previous attempts to answer this 
question in two big groups: formalists and substantivists, based on 
their general objectives. I argue that the second kind of approach 
is more effective because it tries to see and interpret Socratic 
theory as a whole and make it more coherent. It takes Socrates 
as providing a theory of human motivation to act in which the 
agent seeks his happiness, but in which friendship, love, and jus-
tice play a fundamental role.  
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According to Socrates’ eudaimonism, the good is one’s own hap-
piness. It means my happiness is the final criterion for my actions. 
This seems to entail egoism, in the sense the answer to the question 
‘why should I be moral?’ appears to be answered by Socrates as sa-
ying ‘because it makes me happy’. 
 But there are also common sense views about what ethics, 
morality, and being a virtuous agent mean that seem to be contra-
dictory with the idea that the Socratic moral view entails egoism. 
So we could ask: ‘In the Socratic theory, can a virtuous agent be 
an egoist?’ In this paper I will attempt to answer this question, the 
question of whether Socratic ethical theory entails egoism. 
In order to do that, I will present and examine some previous 
attempts to do this. I will divide these attempts into two general 
groups. I will call the first group formalist, because it focuses mainly 
on the form of the Socratic arguments and their coherence in parti-
cular dialogues; and I will call the second group substantive because 
it seeks to evaluate Socrates’ position in a broader picture, in his 
theory as a whole; in this sense they seem to be seeing Socrates as 
holding a more substantial position about human motivation. My 
position is that although the focus of the first group is very impor-
tant in the sense that it allows us to see the strength of Socrates’ 
arguments in particular places, a more charitable interpretation and 
one that addresses the problem I will be outlining needs to explain 
the Socratic theory as a whole to assess its coherence1. 
I. The problem: 
In the Gorgias, during Socrates’ dispute with Polus about the 
usefulness of oratory, Socrates asks: 
Do you think that when people do something, they want the thing 
they’re doing at the time, or the things for the sake of which they do 
what they’re doing? Do you think that people who take medicines 
prescribed by their doctors, for instance, want what they’re doing, the 
act of taking the medicine, with all its discomfort, or do they want to 
1 Obviously, it means we need to know his theory as a whole very well, and I don’t pretend to have such 
knowledge of the Socratic theory. On this evaluation of Socratic theory, I will follow George Rude-
busch (2003) and Terrence Irwin (1977).
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be healthy, the thing for the sake of which they’re taking it? (Gorgias: 
467c, Zeyl trans). 
Polus answers it is obvious they want the thing for the sake of 
which they are doing the thing. Socrates assumes that because there 
cannot be an infinite regress, there must be something for the sake 
of which we do all the things, and this is the good. Later he asks 
Callicles: “Do you also think as we do that the end of all action is 
what’s good, and that we should do all other things for its sake, but 
no it for their sake?” (Gorgias: 499e). 
Although Socrates didn’t clearly establish here that the final 
good is happiness (as he does in Symposium 205a2), he says those 
who act unjustly cannot be happy. He says this in response to Polus’ 
statement that Archelaus –who rules Macedonia– has committed 
a lot of crimes and is, nevertheless, happy. Socrates claims it is im-
possible, because “injustice, and corruption of soul as a whole, is the 
most shameful thing (Gorgias: 477d).” He concludes “The happiest 
man, then, is the one who doesn’t have any badness in his soul 
(Gorgias: 478d).” 
According to this, we have:  
1.  There are intermediate things (actions) that we pursue for 
the sake of other things (actions). 
2.  At the end of an ethical explanatory chain, there is the 
good. This is the final reason why we do what we do. 
3.  The good is happiness, understood as the well-being (eudai-
monia) of the soul (506e). 
4.  The well-being that counts as a final reason to act is that of 
the agent´s soul. 
From this, we get the Eudaimonist Axiom, according to which 
“happiness is desired by all human beings as their ultimate end of 
all their rational acts (Vlastos, 1991: 203).” And it seems to follow 
from that axiom that the questions “Why should I be moral?” or 
“Why should I be just?” must be answered, in the Socratic account, 
by appealing to my own happiness. The reason why I must act in 
such a way is because it promotes my happiness. My last reason to 
act is an egoistic one and my regarding for others seems to be just 
2 “That´s what makes happy people happy, isn´t it –possessing good things. There´s no need to ask fur-
ther, ‘What´s the point of wanting happiness?’ The answer you gave seems to be final.” 
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instrumental to my happiness. Is this Socrates’ position? Does he 
think an agent can be virtuous and, at the same time, egoist? 
There are a lot of attempts to answer this puzzle. As I said earlier, 
I classify some of those answers as following two different strategies. 
The first one I will consider is mainly focused on the soundness and 
validity of specific arguments on some Socratic dialogues. I call this 
strategy formalist. George Klosko and Gorge Nakhnikian’s accounts 
are examples of this type. I call substantive the second strategy used, 
because it seems to me it attempts to go beyond the first one, and 
give a broader interpretation of Socrates’ view. George Redebuch 
and Terence Irving’s approaches use this second strategy. 
The order in which I present the views show what I think is a 
sort of conceptual development or improvement on the interpreta-
tions3. In this sense, it is worth noting that those in the first group 
claim that Socrates holds egoism because he needs it as a dialectical 
move or a sort of rhetorical tool to support another position. I think 
this interpretation fails to capture the complete Socratic picture4, 
because it doesn´t seem to be faithful to his general method or fit his 
general views. My thesis is that Socrates cannot be recommending 
us to be egoists. It cannot be the case that he is claiming that we 
can be at the same time both virtuous and egoists. Following Irwin, 
I want to say Socrates holds eudaimonism, which is a self-interested 
theory, but it doesn´t entail egoism.  
II. Interpretations  
A. Formalists
Those who are in this group answer the question whether Socra-
tes theory entails egoism by showing how this position is required 
for him to hold some other position, analyzing specific arguments, 
and evaluating the force of the egoism’s thesis on those arguments. 
3 It means I am not following a chronological order in the presentation of the views. In fact, Irwin´s 
account is prior to the first type of answers that I call formalist. In despite of the time that is between 
all those considerations, I think Irwin´s view is still the most satisfactory to the question I am trying to 
answer. 
4 Obviously, I am aware that there is evidence to support this interpretation. George Klosko and George 
Nakhnikian, the authors I am considering here show that very well. Moreover, they not only give good 
and abundant evidence to support their position, they also make formalization of Socrates arguments 
and analyze them in detail. I just think they fail to see the Socratic theory as a coherent corpus. 
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In this section, I will show two examples of this strategy. The 
first one, by George Klosko, claims Socrates affirms egoism in order 
to deny akrasia, and succeeds in his propose. The second example 
is George Nakhnikian’s approach that says Socrates denies akrasia 
by affirming psychological egoism, but he fails in supporting his po-
sition. 
George Klosko and On the Analysis of the Protagoras 
Klosko says that in order to deny akrasia in the Protagoras, So-
crates uses egoism as a “crucial dialectical move”: 
Socrates’ interpretation of akrasia in the Protagoras is dependent on 
a certain view of human motivation, which we may call Egoism… 
Socrates is able to reduce the many’s account of akrasia to absurdity by 
showing it conflicts with the obvious truth of egoism (Klosko, 1980: 
307). 
In the Platonic dialogue, Socrates and Protagoras are inquiring 
whether there is one virtue with many names or if there are diffe-
rent virtues. The problem of akrasia arises when Socrates asks Prota-
goras what he thinks is the role of knowledge on people’s behavior, 
i.e. if he thinks knowledge can rule a person or not. Protagoras an-
swers “wisdom and knowledge are anything but the most powerful 
forces in human activity.” (352d, Lombardo and Bell trans). Then, 
Socrates says: 
(…) most people aren’t going to be convinced by us. They maintain 
that most people are unwilling to do what is best, even though they 
know what it is and are able to do it. And when I have asked them the 
reason for this, they say that those who act that way do so because they 
are overcome by pleasure or pain or are being ruled by one of those 
things I referred to just now (352d-e, Lomb & Bell trans).   
To show that the many are wrong, Klosko says, Socrates needs 
to reduce to absurdity what they maintain. And he does so by cons-
tructing an argument whose premise and conclusion presupposes 
egoism. He claims Socrates’ strategy is powerful and successful be-
cause it is pointing out what everybody holds without being aware 
of that, and without knowing the implications of such a belief. Fo-
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llowing Klosko’s formulation (Klosko, 1980: 312), let’s describe a 
situation of akrasia in these terms: 
1. A man does evil
2. Knowing it is evil
3. He is not compelled to do it
And the many’s explanation for his conduct is: 
4. Because he is overcome by pleasure
Socrates says 4 is absurd because it conflicts with the obvious 
statement that human beings “pursue pleasure as being good and 
avoid pain as bad.” (354c, Lomb. & Bell trans). Klosko claims this 
has two important corollaries for Socrates’ view: “The ignorance 
theorem: if any agent chooses between goods p and q, with p greater 
than q, so as to get/to do q instead of p, he does so out of ignorance 
(he makes a mistake in estimating the relative values of p and q)”. 
(Klosko, 1980: 310).  
The second corollary is the affirmation of Hedonistic-Egoism or 
psychological hedonism, which allows Socrates to exchange “plea-
sures” for “goods”. Klosko says now we can see that Socrates’ stra-
tegy is clear: 
Egoism is a thesis about intentions, while the many’s view of akrasia 
has moral agents behaving in apparent contradiction to egoism. But 
the contradiction is only apparent, since, in describing akrasia, the 
many describe only the agent’s observed behavior, without making 
any reference to his intentions (Klosko, 1980: 315). 
Although Klosko recognizes some equivocations and ambigui-
ties in Socrates’s holding of egoism5, he thinks the strategy succeed 
because it proves akrasia is absurd. The egoism´s thesis succeeded as 
a tool to show akrasia doesn´t stand. 
George Klosko and The First Socratic Paradox
Nakhnikian says the three Socratic paradoxes are all related to 
psychological egoism and to the dictum that virtue is knowledge 
5 For example, in Socrates’ interpretation of “overcome” because it misconstrues the nature of the choi-
ce; Klosko says: “(…) in arguing that an art of measurement alone would conquer akrasia, Socrates 
neglects the role of various psychic forces –desire, passion, emotion- in certain kind of choices. In 
addition to the art of weighing pleasures, our heavy friend would require the fortitude to use it” (Klosko, 
1980: 322). 
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and vice is ignorance. The first Socratic paradox is “no man desires 
evil, all men desire the good.” (Nakhnikian, 1973: 1)6. Nakhnikian 
evaluates the arguments offered in Meno and Gorgias to defend this 
paradox, but for constraints of time I will focus my attention only 
on Meno.  
At 77b, Meno says “virtue is to desire beautiful things and have 
the power to acquire them (Grube trans).” But then, Socrates asks 
him if it implies there are people who desire bad things, and Meno 
replies this seems to be the case. Socrates then counters by asking 
whether people really want those bad things or they don’t know 
those things are bad things. Because nobody wants to be miserable 
and unhappy, they both agree, “those who have no knowledge of 
these things and believe them to be good clearly desire good things 
(77e, Grube trans).”
Nakhnikian claims Meno asserts here two hypotheses: one that 
says there are men who desire evils believing them to be goods; and 
the second that says there are also men who desire evils knowing 
them to be evils. Meno divides the second hypothesis into two parts 
that establish a difference between believing that evils are good for 
those who possess them, and knowing that evil harms those who 
possess it. Socrates believes the first part is conceptually impossible 
(if they know something is bad they cannot believe bad things are 
good for them) and the second is psychologically impossible. 
This implies Socrates is making a crucial assumption here, that 
there is a conceptual relation between the concept of evil (or good) 
and the notion of being harmful (or beneficial): 
(…) a relation like the one that exists between being red and being 
colored or between being a cat and being a mammal. One does not 
know what it is for something to be red if one does not know that 
nothing can be red and not colored. In like a manner, as Socrates 
understand things, one does not know what it is for something to be 
evil if one does not know that nothing can be evil and not harm those 
who possess it. In other words, we are not thinking of evil if we are 
not thinking of that which harms its possessor (Nakhnikian, 1973: 4). 
6 The second is “no man who (knows or) believes that an action is evil does it willingly” and the third 
is that “it is better to suffer injustice at the hands of others than to do unjust acts oneself (Nakhnikian, 
1980:1).” 
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After some explanations and formulations of Socrates’ argu-
ments to defend this paradox, Naknikian assesses the general strate-
gy as a failure. He claims that premise 1). “If a man knows something 
is evil, then he knows that the thing will harm those who possess 
it” is false under one natural interpretation, and under another it is 
tautological. When it is tautological, the burden is on premise 2). 
“If a man knows that it will harm him to possess something, then 
he does not want to possess it” (the psychological assumption). But 
this premise is false. 
He claims 1). is false if ‘evil’ is understood in one of the ways in 
which it is commonly used. We can imagine, for example, an inco-
rrigible criminal who is punished. According to Socrates, the cri-
minal is punished justly, which is good. But, Nakhnikian says, “by 
hypothesis punishing an incorrigible man will do him no good at 
all. His punishment serves only as a deterrent to others. Here, then, 
is something good that does not benefit its possessor (Nakhnikian, 
1980: 9).” And 1). is a tautology if ‘evil’ is understood in the special 
sense that Socrates gives its Greeks counterpart, kakos, namely, as 
at least implying harm to its possessor. 
As a result the burden is on 2)., but it is also false. Some people 
know and others believe that smoking cigarettes daily over long 
periods of time is harmful to them. Nonetheless, most of them in-
tensely crave an amount of cigarettes that they know or believe is 
potentially deleterious to their health. Nakhnikian ends this part 
concluding that the support given in Meno for the first paradox is 
unsound, and because of that “the first paradox remains unproved” 
and therefore “is false (Nakhnikian, 1980: 12).”
We have seen two attempts to see if Socrates´s theory entails 
egoism. Both claim it entails egoism because Socrates needs to hold 
it in order to deny akrasia. Klosko thinks the dialectical move suc-
ceeded while Nakhnikian thinks don’t. As I have said before, both 
fail on seen Socrates’ moral theory in a broader picture. 
B. Substantivists
I call substantivis this second set of attempts to answer the ques-
tion whether Socrates’ theory entails egoism because it seems to me 
the interpreters are trying to understand Socrates’ conception about 
human motivation by taking into account his theory as a whole. 
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They do so not only assessing particular arguments in specific dialo-
gues but also regarding if it is coherent to say one could be virtuous 
and egoist. In this sense, I think this second strategy more adequa-
tely addresses the question that motivates this paper.
With this distinction in mind I will now consider George 
Rudebusch and Terrence Irwin’s interpretations. According to 
Rudebusch’s view, Socrates would be egoist if he were a eudaemo-
nist, but he is not a eudaemonist. He proposes to consider Socra-
tes as holding an agent-neutral perfectionism theory. Unlike Ru-
debusch, Irwin claims Socrates is a eudaemonist but eudaemonism 
doesn’t entail an ethically objectionable egoism7.
Rudebusch and Socratic Perfectionism
Rudebusch starts by recognizing that there are at least three im-
portant passages where Socrates appears to be holding egoism. They 
are Euthydemus (278c5-d5), Meno (78a), and Protagoras (356b). But 
there are also some passages that seem to show Socrates holding the 
opposite view: Apology (28b) and Crito (45c), where he appeals to 
considerations of duty, justice, and righteousness. 
He says there have been two general strategies to reconciling 
the texts: interpreting Socrates as egoist and as eudaemonist. But 
both positions are self-regarding about value in the sense they think 
only the self’s happiness is intrinsically valuable. Because of that, 
they face similar objections. 
Assessing the strategy of considering Socrates as an egoist, Ru-
debusch says it is possible to interpret the Apology and Crito passages 
as subordinating virtue, duty, justice, and regard for others to my 
own happiness. But he finds at least three good reasons to think it 
is not right. First of all “This instrumentalist interpretation is un-
faithful to its own start: Crito 48b says living well and living justly 
are the same thing. But if a and b are the very same thing, it is not 
possible for a to be a means to b” (Rudebusch, 2003: 131). 
7  I am aware Klosko’s theory is subsequent to Irwin´s theory. In fact, there are 26 years between them. 
And I really think Klosko suggestion is cogent, original, and puts Socratic theory in the best position 
between moral theories (because integrates virtues, moral obligation and impartiality). But I think his 
interpretation is too much charitative, and it is not well supported by the evidence. In fact, in certain 
sense I attach my view to the traditional view about Socratic theory, which sees it mainly interested 
on the concept of virtue rather than on the concept of duty as the central notion to evaluate human 
actions.
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Second, he says, charity also raises some problems for this in-
terpretation. The main of them is that “ethical egoism is morally 
crude. It would have us value virtue and the concerns of others for 
the wrong reason, with an impure heart (Rudebusch, 2003: 131).8” 
Third, the interpretation that virtue merely has an instrumental 
value for Socrates would make implausible the Socratic idea that 
“wisdom is necessary (Ethd 281d) and virtue sufficient for happiness 
(Ap 30c-d, 41c-d; Cri 48b; Chrm 173d, 174b; Grg 470e; R I 353e-4a) 
(Rudebusch, 2003: 132).” 
On the other hand, there is the strategy that sees Socrates as 
a eudaemonist. Rudebusch considers that although this strategy 
doesn’t have the previous problems, it has its own. It is expressed 
in a dilemma: 
The eudaemonist holds that virtuous living constitutes my happiness. 
But why do I make virtue a constituent of my happiness? Is it because 
(first horn) I happen to find that my virtuous living is my happy living 
or does it make me happy because (second horn) it is intrinsically 
worthwhile? (Rudebusch, 2003: 133). 
Either horn we choose will conduce to the same: eudaemonism 
is another self-regarding theory of the good, and should be avoided 
for the same reasons we use to avoid the egoist view. There are 
also other-regarding theories of the good: selfless altruism and self-
including altruism. Both claim that the good is the good of others. 
But they seem to be ruled out for similar reasons as the previous 
ones, because they are agent-relative accounts9. All those theories 
are perfectionists, in the sense all of them define “the good and the 
good human soul in terms of human nature and the good human 
8 He says: “Socrates conceived of happiness as invulnerable, claiming that nothing can harm a good 
human being in life or death (Ap 41d). His advice in the Apology (28b) and Crito (48c-d) that there 
is ‘only one thing to consider’ –namely virtue- is a locus classicus, together with the scripture passages 
of the doctrine of single-mined devotion to virtue.” (Redebusch, 2003: 131).    
9 To be honest, I think Rudebusch doesn’t give good reasons to do so. Or at least those reasons are not 
clear enough to me. He just claims: “I have included the other-regarding altruisms alongside of self-
regarding egoism and eudaimonism for two reasons. First, it casts eudaimonism –quite properly, in my 
opinion- in a negative light. For ‘self-including altruism’ will, I take it, strike everyone as a peculiar, 
indeed dishonest concept: an altruism in which the only good maybe the self´s! By analogy, other-
including eudaimonism, in which the only good may be that of others, should seem just as unacceptable 
as an ethical theory. The second reason is that, by exhausting the possibilities of agent-relative accou-
nts, the diagram makes it apparent why agent-relativism as a hole is unacceptable.” (Redebusch, 2003: 
135). He gives a diagram and expects we see there the reason why is it unacceptable, but I just cannot 
see them.  
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life... But perfectionism need not make the good agent-relative in 
this way (Rudebusch, 2003: 136).”
Although he recognizes there is no consensus in contemporary 
ethical theory about which theory could be superior (agent-relative 
or agent-neutral), he thinks the study of Socratic ethics can illumi-
nate this discussion. 
I think his interpretation is both cogent and original. To support 
it he goes to The Republic 341-2, where Socrates gives his account 
of expertise. There, Thrasymachus says: “No craftsman, expert, or 
ruler makes an error at the moment when he is ruling… A ruler, 
insofar as he is a ruler, never makes errors and unerringly decrees 
what is best for himself (341a, Grube trans).” 
Then Socrates answers analyzing the examples of a doctor and a 
ship’s captain, and makes Thrasymachus realize that their expertise 
has something advantageous to bodies and sailors. This is, “no other 
craft seeks its own advantage –for it has no further needs- but the 
advantage of that of which it is the craft (342c, Grube trans).”
As a result, Socrates claims, “no one in any position of rule, in-
sofar as he is a ruler, seeks or orders what is advantageous to himself, 
but what is advantageous to his subject, that on which he practices 
his craft (342e, Grube trans).” 
Rudebusch claims that expertise, in this sense, must be agent-
neutral in his motivation. It is so because what matters to him/her 
is to maximize the craft’s good, without considering whose good will 
it be. It would be just the health in general, the virtue, and so on. 
Obviously, there are some possible objections to this interpreta-
tion (he considers two but mentions at least seven10). Nevertheless, 
he thinks his account is better than the rivals, because if we take a 
rival theory to be true “we would have to attribute, uncharitable, an 
inferior theoretical account to Socrates, whether as egoist, which is 
morally repugnant and incompatible with his claims that wisdom 
is necessary and virtue sufficient for happiness, or as eudaemonist, 
which escapes moral repugnance only by ceasing to be self-regar-
ding in all but name (Rudebusch, 2003: 140).” 
As I said before, Rudebusch’s view is both cogent and origi-
nal. Moreover, it seems to be a good attempt to solve the puzzle of 
10 Antonio Chu, Charles Kahn, Rachana Kamtekar, Donald Morrison, Terry Penner, Naomy Reshotko, 
and Dan Russell. 
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Socrates making statements about human motivation that sounds 
egoists while framing an ethical theory that describes the virtuous 
agent as one with high moral standards. Nevertheless, it is not clear 
enough why should we prefer a neutral-agent theory instead an 
agent-relative one. After all, an agent-regarding account need not 
be morally reprehensible. 
 
Terence Irwin and Plato’s Moral Theory
Irwin holds an interpretation according to which Socrates is 
a eudaemonist. But, unlike Rudebusch, he claims eudaemonism 
doesn’t entail an ethically objectionable egoism.11 He says: 
These questions about ethical egoism are not about Plato’s concerns. 
He is not trying to describe morality, as we tend to understand it, or to 
defend egoism from what we call the moral point of view. He wants to 
know what in general it is rational for someone to do; and this ques-
tion remains to be asked when we understand what the moral point of 
view is and what it requires –if we identify morality by its concern for 
other people’s, or everyone’s, interest. Plato is not offering an absurd 
way to understand morality, but asking the apparently sensible ques-
tion whether it is worthwhile to do what morality is normally suppo-
sed to require (Irwin, 1977: 251).
By distinguishing between two types of egoism, Irwin shows it 
is possible to avoid the charge against eudaimonism that says it en-
tails not genuine other-regarding virtues. There is moral solipsism, 
which considers all virtues as instrumentally valuable for the agent’s 
good, apart from any benefit or harm to other people; and moral 
egocentrism, which says “virtue must contribute to some end va-
lued by the agent as part of his own good (Irwin, 1977: 255).” So if 
Socrates and Plato are egocentrists, Irwin says, their views are not 
touched by the same objections to egoism and could be seen as not 
conflicting with morality at all.  
11 It is worth to take into account that Irwin considers there is a development on Platonic dialogues, and 
because of that he makes a distinction between Socrates and Plato’s views. Because there are a lot of 
discussion about the classification of Platonic dialogues and the correspondence of the view to Socrates 
or Plato, I will just continue my work without paying too much attention to this particular issue. We 
can keep thinking on Socrates as the character of the Platonic dialogues and evaluate his position as we 
have been doing it.
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We can find evidence in Platonic dialogues to hold both Plato 
and Socrates are and they are not solipsists. Protagoras, some pas-
sages from the Republic, and Plato’s contemplative ideal seem to 
support the solipsist view. Pheado, Pheadrus, Republic II, Grogias, 
and the just man’s ‘propagative’ desire at the Symposium appear to 
hold the opposite non-solipsist position. But Irwin asks us to think 
which is the “Plato’s normal view of psychic harmony in the Repu-
blic” (Irwin, 1977: 257).
 As many others have suggested, the main contradiction 
with the egoist view arises when we consider friendship, love, and 
justice on Platonic account, because they imply regard for others. 
Irwin claims that to understand how his conception of justice 
doesn’t imply solipsism we should think on the state of the soul 
Plato says is that of the just man: 
He does not think of just actions as instrumental means to some sepa-
rate state of the soul which might persist without further just action. 
If someone has the inner peace and extensible psychic harmony of the 
p-just man, but does not care about just action, Plato will simply deny 
that he is p-just or is really controlled by the rational part; if p-justice 
were simply inner harmony, it could not be denied to the deviant men. 
Plato expects the really just man to have the kind of psychic order 
which chooses just actions or, in the Symposium’s terms, wants to pro-
pagate virtue (Irwin, 1977: 257). 
Regarding friendship and love, we should refer to Plato’s ac-
count of ascent and propagation, according to which the lover will 
want to propagate virtue and justice on his/her friend or beloved. 
So it could be seen egocentric, because it is justified by the virtuous 
man’s own final good; but this final good is not solipsistic. There is 
an important difference, Irwin points out here, between self-love 
and the love of the non-rational part of the soul. The prior doesn’t 
conflict with the pursuit of virtue and altruistic morality. 
In despite of the good defense Irwin has made of moral Socratic 
theory, in the sense it could be seen as altruistic, it is interesting 
to notice some problems regarding the relation with others in this 
view. Consider, for instance, that Socratic altruism depends on his 
theory of love (‘Platonic love’), one of whose more important fea-
tures is the search of the improvement of the beloved. In this sense, 
there is no reciprocity in his view. In Irwin´s words: 
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Plato is open to objection for his view of the beloved´s role in the pro-
cess; the metaphor of the lover as sculptor and the beloved as statue 
revels the serious fault (Phdr. 252d5-253b1), as though the beloved 
were simply the passive material which the lover moulds to his own 
design… the selection of this paradigm for Platonic lovers’ ethical ac-
count is significant itself, and Plato offers no ethical account of love 
between equals (Irwin, 1977: 269). 
As a result, we are justified in going back and ask again: ‘Is he 
considering persons and their interests by their sake, or just as a 
sort of instrument?’ Irwin´s answer goes as follows. We contrast the 
‘concern for someone for his own sake’ with purely exploitative 
concern, with his use as an instrument to achieve my ideals. When 
Plato talks of the improvement of the beloved, he is thinking on 
that that would make him/her better in Socratic terms, i.e., by par-
ticipation of the good. He says: “And so if A tries to make B more 
just, then, on Plato´s view, he is not exploiting B for some ideal 
irrelevant to B’s interests; but he is promoting B´s overriding inter-
est” (Irwin, 1977: 271). This means the Platonic lover have non-
exploitative concern for the beloved´s interests. Obviously, Irwin 
grants there is still possible to say that Platonic love fails to meet a 
Kantian requirement on the love of persons, which is the respect for 
the beloved´s own interest as such, even if it means to harm him/
herself.12 
There is still another interesting objection to Platonic theory 
that Irwin considers, related with altruism and his view of justice. 
If we think that justice has to do with interest and people´s rights, 
a similar problem arises than that regarding interests. Plato´s moral 
theory accords rights to no one. Irwin claims: “Plato assumes that 
justice will always benefit the recipient; but he recognizes no duties 
of justice which protect a man´s rights even against his own inter-
ests” (Irwin, 1977: 274). 
At this point, we could ask why Plato holds eudaimonism or, in 
other words, which are the advantages of the eudaemonist’s view, 
given the problems that seems to entail. According to Irwin, it gives 
12 Irwin provides some elements of his theory of Platonic love and says it is deeply indebted to Vlastos 
(648), but he has doesn´t think all his criticisms are justified. In particular, and related with our topic, 
he doesn´t agree with Vlastos in saying that “Plato undervalues liberty because he values people only 
for their usefulness” (Irwin, 1977: 343-345, note 28). 
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a convincingly answer to the question about how we should live, 
the role of virtues in achieving a good life, and moral obligation: 
The appeal to a final good is Plato’s procedure for asking a question a 
rational man is right to ask, and for answering it; when the procedure 
is rightly understood, it is clearer that he does not seek to show that 
morality promotes a solipsist end, but that it is worthwhile in itself for 
someone who correctly decides the kind of life he has best reason to 
choose [… eudaemonist approach to morality] might seem the only 
reasonable answer to a question which every reflective moral agent 
needs to decide. (Irwin, 1997: 267). 
We have seen four attempts to explain a puzzle that rises when 
we consider some Platonic passages were Socrates says we should 
do the best to achieve virtue while in others seems to reduce the 
criteria to choose between actions to the consideration of the final 
agent´s good. The last criterion is the agent´s happiness. If we un-
derstand this later affirmation as Socrates holding egoism, the ex-
planation of friendship, love, and justice as regard for others doesn´t 
seem to fit in his theory as a whole. I have argued that formalists 
approaches that try to show Socrates holds egoism as a dialectical 
tool to support another thesis fail in the sense that seem to rule out 
a coherent explanation of those notions inside the Socratic theory. 
Because of that, I considered approaches I called substan-
tives, in order to make sense of what seemed contradictory on 
Socratic theory of human motivation to act. I founded Irwin 
approach the most satisfactory, due his deeply and broad unders-
tanding of Socratic and Platonic theory that shows it is possible 
for Socrates to be eudaemonist and self-regarded without being 
egoist. His interpretation is strongly supported by the evidence, 
rigorous, and can make sense of different concepts of great im-
portance within Socratic theory, as that of friendship, love, and 
justice
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